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STATEMENT REGARDING JURISDICTION 
This case is on appeal from two final orders/judgments of the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County issued by the Honorable Judge Lee A. Dever. 
Mark Greer, the Plaintiff/Appellant, appealed to the Utah Supreme Court, which 
has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-3(j). The Utah Supreme Court, 
pursuant to Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, poured this appeal 
over to this Court. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Whether statute of limitations was tolled due to a statutory prohibition 
for a period from June 12, 2003 to November 3, 2003 of Appellee BIG 5 
CORP, a Delaware corporation. 
Standard of Review: The applicability of a statute of limitations is a 
question of law which is reviewed for correctness. Spears v. Warr, 2002 
UT 24, 44 P.3d 742. "However, the applicability of the statute of 
limitations and the discovery rule also involves a subsidiary factual 
determination—the point at which a person reasonably should know that 
he or she has suffered a legal injury. This is a question of fact." Id. 
II. Whether placing of the Complaint in the date stamp pleadings drop box 
at the rear entrance of Scott Mattheson Courthouse constitutes a filing 
for purposes of establishing the date filed of pleadings. 
Standard of Review: The placing of a complaint in the date/time 
stamping box for filing pleadings constitutes a filing for establishing the 
date of filed pleadings is a question of law which is reviewed for 
correctness. Spears v. Wan\ 2002 UT 24, 44 P.3d 742. "However, the 
use of the pleadings drop box also involves a subsidiary factual 
determination—the point at which a person reasonably should know that 
he or she has properly filed a complaint. This is a question of fact." Id. 
Whether Appellant was entitled to a hearing on Defendant /Appellee's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, and/or whether Appellant was entitled 
to a hearing on Plaintiff/Appellant's Motion to Alter or Amend. 
Standard of Review: The applicability of Rule 7 (e) Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure involving a final disposition is a question of law which is 
reviewed for correctness. Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, 44 P.3d 742. 
"However, the applicability of Rule 7 (e) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
involving a final disposition also involves a subsidiary factual 
determination-whether the opposition to the motion is frivolous or the 
issue has been authoritatively decided. This is a question of fact." Id. 
2 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Resolution of this case necessarily involves application of the following Utah 
Code provisions and Rule: 
§ 78-12-41 Effect of injunction or prohibition 
When the commencement of an action is stayed by injunction or a 
statutory prohibition, the time of the continuance of the injunction or 
prohibition is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the 
action. 
§786-2-307 (§ 78-12-25) Within four years. 
An action may be brought within four years: 
(1) after the last charge is made or the last payment is received: 
(a) upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an 
instrument in writing; 
(b) on an open store account for any goods, wares, or merchandise; or 
(c) on an open account for work, labor or services rendered, or 
materials furnished; 
(2) for a claim for relief or a cause of action under the following 
sections of Title 25, Chapter 6, Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act 
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(1 )(a), which in specific situations limits the time 
for action to one year, under Section 25-6-10; 
(b) Subsection 25-6-5(1 )(b); or 
(c) Subsection 25-6-6(1); and 
(3) for relief not otherwise provided for by law. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session 
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Rule 7 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(e) Hearings. The court may hold a hearing on any motion. A party 
may request a hearing in the motion, in a memorandum or in the 
request to submit for decision. A request for hearing shall be 
separately identified in the caption of the document containing the 
request. The court shall grant a request for a hearing on a motion 
under Rule 56 or a motion that would dispose of the action or any 
claim or defense in the action unless the court finds that the motion 
or opposition to the motion is frivolous or the issue has been 
authoritatively decided. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case arises out of an accident that occurred on December 1, 2001 at the store of 
Defendant/Appellee, BIG 5 CORP dba BIG 5 SPORTING GOODS, hereinafter 
referred to as "BIG 5", located at 2236 South 1300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Plaintiff/Appellant, Mark Greer, hereinafter referred to as "Greer", was shopping 
with his sons for a snowboard. While they were looking at snowboards, one board 
that was placed on display, high on the wall, fell and hit Greer in the head. Greer's 
counsel filed the Complaint (R-1-5) in this matter by placing it in the after hours box 
for filing pleadings near the rear door of the Mattheson Courthouse on November 
28, 2005. He date stamped a copy of the Complaint for his records. A copy of that 
date stamped Complaint (R-60-62) was served on BIG 5. BIG 5 filed a Motion to 
Dismiss with an accompanying Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss (R-
12-20). After withdrawing its Motion to Dismiss (R-29), BIG 5 filed an Answer and 
Jury Demand (R-24-28). On October 24, 2007, BIG 5 filed a Motion for Leave to 
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Amend Answer (R-43-45) and BIG 5 filed an Amended Answer (R-69-73). BIG 5 
then filed a Motion for Summary Judgment with accompanying Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (R-74-80). Greer filed a Reply 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment with 
attachments including the Certificate of Resignation of Registered Agent (R-89-95). 
BIG 5 filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
with a Notice to Submit for Decision (R-96-116). Greer filed a Notice to Submit for 
Decision and Request for Oral Argument (R-123-124). On March 28, 2008, Judge 
Dever issued a Ruling granting BIG 5's Motion for Summary Judgment (R125-128). 
Greer filed a Motion to Alter Judgment or Motion to Set Aside Judgment with a 
Memorandum in Support of the Motion (R-129-133). Big 5 filed a Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Alter, Amend or Set Aside the Judgment (R-134-
138). Greer filed his Notice of Appeal on April 25, 2008. On May 5, 2008, Greer 
filed a Reply Memorandum in support of Motion to Alter Judgment or Motion to Set 
Aside Judgment (R-145-147) and a Notice to Submit for Decision and Request for 
Oral Argument (R-148-149). Judge Dever entered a Minute Entry Ruling/Motion 
to Alter or Set Aside on May 8, 2008 denying Plaintiff Greer's Motion (R-150-151). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case arises out of an accident that occurred on December 1, 2001 at 
the store of Defendant/Appellee, BIG 5 CORP dba BIG 5 SPORTING GOODS. 
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Plaintiff/Appellant, Mark Greer, hereinafter referred to as "Greer," was shopping 
with his sons for a snowboard. (R-l-5) While they were looking at snowboards, one 
board that was placed on display, high on the wall above the snowboard rack, 
dislodged for no apparent reason, other than it had not been secured, and hit Greer in 
the head. Greer was severely injured and has incurred large medical bills and lost 
income as a result of this incident. Greer's counsel filed the Complaint (R-l-5) in 
this matter by placing it in the after hours box for filing pleadings near the rear door 
of the Mattheson Courthouse on November 28, 2005, after visiting his father in the 
hospital shortly before his death. When he dropped it off, he date stamped a copy of 
the Complaint for his records. A copy of that date stamped Complaint (R-60-62) was 
served on BIG 5. Initially Big 5 filed a Motion to Dismiss(R-29) which BIG 5 later 
withdrew. BIG 5 then filed an Answer and Jury Demand (R-24-28). On October 
24, 2007, BIG 5 filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Answer (R-43-45) and BIG 5 
filed an Amended Answer (R-69-73). BIG 5 then filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment with accompanying Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment (R-74-80). Greer filed a Reply Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, with attachments including the 
Certificate of Resignation of Registered Agent (R-89-95). BIG 5!s Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment was filed with a Notice 
to Submit for Decision (R-96-116). Greer filed a Notice to Submit for Decision and 
Request for Oral Argument (R-123-124). On March 28, 2008, Judge Dever, without 
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the requested oral argument (hearing), issued a Ruling granting BIG 5's Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R125-128). Greer filed a Motion to Alter Judgment or Motion 
to Set Aside Judgment with a Memorandum in Support of the Motion (R-129-133). 
Big 5 filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Alter, Amend or 
Set Aside the Judgment (R-134-138). Greer filed his Notice of Appeal on April 25, 
2008. On May 5, 2008, Greer filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Alter Judgment or Motion to Set Aside Judgment (R-145-147) and a Notice to 
Submit for Decision and Request for Oral Argument (R-148-149). Judge Dever, 
again without requested oral argument, entered a Minute Entry Ruling/Motion to 
Alter or Set Aside on May 8, 2008, denying Plaintiff Greer's Motion (R-150-151). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The District Court determined that Plaintiffs Complaint was barred because the 
District Court Complaint was date stamped December 2, 2005. However, the 
Plaintiff/Appellant's Counsel's copy date was stamped November 28, 2005, when 
the Complaint was filed in the court drop box. When challenging a finding of fact, 
Appellate Counsel is required to properly marshal the evidence. Child v. Gonda, 
972 P.2d 425, 433-34 (Utah 1998). Here there is literally no evidence to marshal. 
Mr. Greer properly marshals the evidence supporting the trial Court's findings of 
fact, which is literally only the filed original complaint. That original complaint is 
compared with the date stamped copy served upon BIG 5. Additionally, Mr. Greer 
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having properly marshaled the evidence, shows that evidence exists that would raise 
sufficient questions of fact and place the rules of law in question, Chen v. Stewart, 
2004 UT 82, 100 P.3rd 1177. Mark Greer's claims are not barred by the statute of 
limitation. Plaintiff/Appellant's Counsel placed the original Complaint in the box 
designated for filing of pleadings after hours on November 28, 2005. Appellant 
argues that is the date of the filing of the Complaint. If November 28, 2005 is 
determined to be the date of the filing of Complaint, Summary Judgment cannot be 
granted. If it is determined that the date stamped by the clerk of court on December 
2, 2005, then Summary Judgement is proper unless the statute of limitation has been 
tolled. Defendant BIG 5, a Delaware Corporation, was subject to statutory 
prohibition for a period from June 12, 2003 to November 2, 2003. The above 
arguments are not frivolous and have not been decided and the issue has not been 
authoritatively decided. Therefore, Mark Greer was entitled to a hearing on both his 
Opposition to Summary Judgement and his Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment 
pursuant to Rule 7(e) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
ARGUMENT. 
I 
WHETHER STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WAS TOLLED DUE TO A 
STATUTORY PROHIBITION FOR A PERIOD FROM JUNE 12,2003 TO 
NOVEMBER 3,2003 OF APPELLEE BIG 5 , A DELAWARE CORPORATION. 
Defendant properly states that Plaintiffs Negligence Action must be brought within 
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four years of the accident unless it is tolled for appropriate reasons. That is exactly 
what occurred in the present case. If it is determined that placing the Complaint in 
the rear receptacle is not a filing for date purposes, the Utah Code states, § 78-12-
41 Utah Code Annotated. Effect of injunction or prohibition. When the 
commencement of an action is stayed by injunction or a statutory prohibition the 
time of the continuance of the injunction or prohibition is not part of the time 
limited for the commencement of the action. 
The Appellee BIG 5, a Delaware corporation, was subject to a statutory prohibition 
for a period from June 12, 2003 to November 3, 2003 (R-94-95). It was subject to 
this statutory prohibition because it was no longer an active corporation. This was 
because it had forfeited its Certificate of Incorporation under Delaware Law. 
Delaware Statutes § 136: Resignation of registered agent not coupled with 
appointment of successor. The period of time that it did not have a Certificate of 
Incorporation was 144 days. In the present case, according to the ruling of The 
District Court, the Complaint is filed one day late, a fact disputed by Appellant. 
Under any circumstances, it is not late. Appellant had an additional 144 days in 
which to file his Complaint, if he so desired.. The suspension or forfeiture of a 
corporation stayed the statute of limitations. Further, Utah Code states, §78-12-35. 
Effect of absence from state. 
Where a cause of action accrues against a person when he is out of the state, the 
action may be commenced within the term as limited by this chapter after his return 
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to the state. If after a cause of action accrues he departs from the state, the time of 
his absence is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the action. The 
Utah Court of Appeals has upheld this tolling even though the individual was 
subject to service under the Utah Long Arm Statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24. 
In Arnold v. Grigsby, 2008 UTCA 20060481 - 022808; The Court stated, 
the trial court nonetheless determined that the tolling provision of 
section 78-12-35 did not apply in this case because, under Utah's 
long-arm statute, Dr. Grigsby was subject to Utah's jurisdiction and 
amenable to service of process in the state where he resided. The 
trial court relied on Snyder v. Clime, 15 Utah 2d 254, 390 P.2d 915 
(1964), Van Tassell v. Shaffer, 742 P.2d 111 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), 
and Ankers v. Rodman, 995 F. Supp. 1329 (D. Utah 1997), and 
reasoned that, because the Arnolds could serve Dr. Grigsby in 
Tennessee, "the purpose of the tolling statute . . / to prevent a 
defendant from depriving a plaintiff of the opportunity of suing him 
by absenting himself from the state during the period of limitation'" 
was not furthered. While there is a certain logic to the trial court's 
analysis, we conclude that the trial court erred in making this 
determination, as the issue was recently put squarely before the Utah 
Supreme Court, which reached the opposite conclusion. 
TJ21 In Olseth v. Larsen, 2007 UT 29, 158 P.3d 532, the Utah 
Supreme Court answered a certified question of state law from the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. See id. Tj 1. The 
question was whether f22 The appellee in Olseth argued that "when 
the purpose of the tolling statute conflicts with its literal meaning, 
the purpose must be given effect." Id. ]f 20. Accordingly, he claimed 
that "the tolling statute should no longer apply because the need to 
delay the running of the statute of limitations ceases to exist when 
"the long-arm statute . . . brings a defendant within the personal 
jurisdiction of the court." 
The statute of limitations tolled under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 states that 
when a person against whom a claim has accrued has left the state of Utah 
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and has no agent within the state of Utah upon whom service of process can 
be made, and the person is amenable to service outside the state, pursuant to 
Utah's long-arm statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24, the statute of 
limitations is tolled anyway. That is akin to the fact that even though a 
corporation was not in existence for 144 days it could still be served under 
Utah law. 
If a corporation does not have its Certificate of Incorporation, it does not 
exist in 
its own state of incorporation. In this case that state would be Delaware. If it 
doesn't exist in Delaware, it doesn't exist here in Utah. BIG 5 was absent 
from the State of Utah. It didn't exist for 144 days. Hence, it was not in Utah 
regardless of whether it had an agent of process or not. This fact cannot be 
remedied by the reinstatement of BIG 5 144 days later. Therefore the statute 
of limitations was tolled for 144 days. For purposes of argument only, if you 
accept the fact that the filing of the Complaint was not until December 2, 
2005, it was still filed within the 4 year statute of limitation. 
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II 
WHETHER PLACING OF THE COMPLAINT IN THE DATE 
STAMP PLEADINGS DROP BOX AT THE REAR ENTRANCE OF 
SCOTT MATTHESON COURTHOUSE CONSTITUTES A FILING 
FOR PURPOSES OF ESTABLISHING THE DATE FILED OF 
PLEADINGS. 
The Third District Court pleadings drop box must be viewed in the same 
light as a pleadings box located within the confines of the court clerk's 
office. It would not serve its purpose if it was not. A pleading is deemed 
filed when it is given to a court clerk whether it is handed, or placed in the 
drop box. Therefore, when Appellant's Counsel placed the Complaint in the 
drop box on November 28, 2005, it was filed. November 28, 2005 should be 
the controlling date for the statue of limitations. Appellant's Complaint was 
filed within the 4 years required by statue regardless of whether the tolling 
statue applies. 
Ill 
WHETHER APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED TO A HEARING ON 
DEFENDANT /APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
AND/OR WHETHER APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED TO A HEARING ON 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT'S MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND. 
Was the Court required to grant a hearing or oral argument in a Motion for 
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Summary Judgment? Rule 7 (e) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
(e) Hearings. The court may hold a hearing on any motion. A party 
may request a hearing in the motion, in a memorandum or in the 
request to submit for decision. A request for hearing shall be 
separately identified in the caption of the document containing the 
request. The court shall grant a request for a hearing on a motion 
under Rule 56 or a motion that would dispose of the action or any 
claim or defense in the action unless the court finds that the motion or 
opposition to the motion is frivolous or the issue has been 
authoritatively decided. 
The Defense Motion for Summary Judgment was under Rule 56. Rule 7(e) of 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that 'the Court shall grant a request for a 
hearing on a motion under Rule 56". Rule 7(e) does not say that the Court 
may grant a request for a hearing on a motion under Rule 56. It states "shall 
grant a request for a hearing on a motion under Rule 56." The Court has no 
choice, it is required by statute to grant a hearing on a Rule 56 motion if it is 
not considered frivolous or if it has been authoritatively decided. Plaintiffs 
Motion is not frivolous nor has it been authoritatively decided. Mark Greer's 
Motion to Alter or Amend addresses the Court's mistake in failing to grant the 
hearing on the Summary Judgment. Hence, its denial by the Court is a 
dispositive ruling and as such should require a hearing since it is neither 
frivolous nor has been authoritatively decided. 
CONCLUSION 
The Summary Judgment was improper. The Complaint was filed timely. It was 
filed on November 28, 2005 when it was placed in the pleading receptacle 
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located at the back of the Mattheson Courthouse. Greer's Counsel should be 
justified in relying on the date stamp of the pleading receptacle. If that 
placement is not controlling, it was timely filed because the statute of 
limitations was stayed by statutory prohibition. That prohibition exists because 
BIG 5 had forfeited its Certificate of Incorporation under Delaware Law. It 
forfeited its Certificate of Incorporation for 144 days. It does not matter that 
when it is reinstated those 144 days disappear. This loss of incorporation for 
144 days should stay the statute of limitations even though service could still 
have occurred just the same as the long arm statute. BIG 5fs Motion for 
Summary Judgment should have had a hearing as it was not frivolous nor had 
the question been ruled on authoritatively. Greer's Motion to Alter or Amend is 
also entitled to a hearing because it addresses the failure to allow the hearing in 
the Summary Judgment matter. 
Therefore the Summary Judgment should be set aside and the case should be 
allowed to go forward. 
Respectively submitted this day of September 2008. 
J. KENT HOLLAND 
3838 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Attorney for Appellant 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
MARK GREER, 
Appellant, 
vs, 
BIG 5 CORP. dba BIG 5 SPORTING 
GOODS, a Corporation, 
BRIEF ADDENDUM 
Case No. 20080364 CA 
Plaintiff/Appellant, by and through his counsel of record, J Kent 
Holland states to the Court that only Addendum necessary is Delaware 
Statute Corporations § 136 which is attached. 
Submitted this 26th day of September 2008 
**-*-^^ 
1 W t Holland 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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Statutes -§ 136 Page 1 of2 
§136 
Statutes 
TITLE 8 Corporations 
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL CORPORATION LAW 
§ 136 Resignation of registered agent not coupled with appointment of 
successor. 
§ 136. Resignation of registered agent not coupled with appointment of 
successor. 
Subchapter III. Registered Office and Registered Agent 
(a) The registered agent of 1 or more corporations may resign without 
appointing a successor by filing a certificate of resignation with the Secretary 
of State, but such resignation shall not become effective until 30 days after the 
certificate is filed. The certificate shall be executed and acknowledged by the 
registered agent, shall contain a statement that written notice of resignation 
wras given to each affected corporation at least 30 days prior to the filing of 
the certificate by mailing or delivering such notice to the corporation at its 
address last known to the registered agent and shall set forth the date of such 
notice. 
(b) After receipt of the notice of the resignation of its registered agent, 
provided for in subsection (a) of this section, the corporation for which such 
registered agent was acting shall obtain and designate a new registered agent 
to take the place of the registered agent so resigning in the same manner as 
provided in § 133 of this title for change of registered agent. If such 
corporation, being a corporation of this State, fails to obtain and designate a 
new registered agent as aforesaid prior to the expiration of the period of 30 
days after the filing by the registered agent of the certificate of resignation, the 
Secretary of State shall declare the charter of such corporation forfeited. If 
such corporation, being a foreign corporation, fails to obtain and designate a 
new registered agent as aforesaid prior to the expiration of the period of 30 
days after the filing by the registered agent of the certificate of resignation, the 
Secretary of State shall forfeit its authority to do business in this State. 
(c) After the resignation of the registered agent shall have become 
effective as provided in this section and if no new registered agent shall have 
been obtained and designated in the time and manner aforesaid, service of 
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legal process against the corporation for which the resigned registered agent 
had been acting shall thereafter be upon the Secretary of State in accordance 
with §321 of this title. 
(8 Del. C. 1953, § 136; 56 Del. Laws, c. 50; 56 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 2; 64 
Del. Laws, c. 112, § 5; 69 Del. Laws, c. 233, §§ 1-3; 70 Del. Laws, c. 79, §§ 
5, 6; 70 Del. Laws, c. 587, § 11.) 
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